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INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 
Plaintiffs Petition for Writ of Certiorari is frivolous. As phrased, the questions 
presented are prolix, repetitive, argumentative, and incomprehensible, in violation of 
Rule 49(a)(4), Utah R. App. P. The petition fails to set forth the statutory basis for 
jurisdiction of this Court, as required by Rule 49(a)(6)(D). The statements of the case 
and facts contain no specific citations to the record or court of appeals opinion, as 
required by Rule 49(a)(8). Arid the argument contains no concise statement of the 
''special and important reasons" for issuing the writ, as required by Rule 49(a)(9). The 
plaintiffs failure "to present with accuracy, brevity, and clarity" any justification for 
granting the writ is "a sufficient reason for denying the petition." Rule 49(e). { 
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Whether the court of appeals correctly held the hospital not liable for plaintiffs 
fall on an outside doormat because the sudden lifting of the edge of the mat by a gust of 
wind was a temporary condition of which the hospital had no prior notice. 
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 Plaintiff claims to have filed a "corrected version" of the petition on January 6, 1999, purportedly 
for the sole purpose of correcting spelling errors. However, a comparison of the two versions shows 
substantial alterations of wording (none of which corrects the deficiencies identified above). In addition, 
the revised petition exceeds the 20-page limit, when the Questions Presented section and other matters 
paginated with the tables on pages /// and iv are paginated with the body of the petition, as they should 
be. More importantly, the rules make no provision for filing a "corrected version" of a petition after the 
time for filing has expired. Accordingly, in the absence of an order authorizing a late filing, the 
defendant disregards the second petition and responds to the original petition, filed December 28, 1998. 
OPINION OF COURT OF APPEALS 
The Memorandum Decision of the court of appeals, affirming summary judgment 
for the hospital, was not issued for official publication, but is set forth in the Appendix. 
("Mem. Dec," App. 1.) 
CONTROLLING AUTHORITY 
Consideration of plaintiff s petition is governed by Rule 46(a), Utah R. App. P., 
which sets forth the standards for granting review by writ of certiorari (App. 12.) The 
underlying question presented is governed purely by case law discussed herein. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a premises liability action arising out of plaintiff s fall on a doormat 
outside the entrance to the defendant hospital. Plaintiff fell when a sudden gust of wind 
allegedly blew the edge of the mat into her legs. (R. 1, 48; Mem. Dec. 1.) The hospital 
moved for summary judgment on the basis that the partially wind-blown mat was a 
temporary condition of which it had no prior notice. (R. 91-100.) Plaintiff filed a cross-
motion for summary judgment, identifying no material disputed fact. (R. 130-46; Mem. 
Dec. 2.) The district court granted the hospital's motion on the grounds asserted and 
denied plaintiffs cross-motion. (R. 294, App. 5.) After full briefing, the court of 
appeals affirmed in an unanimous unpublished memorandum decision. (Mem. Dec. 2-3, 
App. 2-3.) The court of appeals also denied plaintiffs petition for rehearing. (App. 4.) 
Plaintiff subsequently filed the petition for writ of certiorari in this Court. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On a windy day in March 1995, around midday, plaintiff went to Cottonwood 
Hospital to visit her doctor. (R. 180.) Plaintiff testified that as she walked toward the 
hospital entrance and stepped onto the outside doormat, "the wind blew part of it up and 
it caused [her] to fall." {Id., H 5.) 
Hospital employees responded to the scene and helped plaintiff into the hospital. 
(R. 55-56.) Plaintiff claims permanent injuries resulting from the fall, but the record 
contains no evidence of such claims. In any event, plaintiffs claimed injuries are not 
material to the legal issue of liability. 
The doormat on which plaintiff fell was a standard commercial-grade mat, four 
feet by thirteen feet, made of indoor/outdoor carpet with rubberized backing to avoid 
slippage. It was manufactured by the 3-M Company for both indoor and outdoor use. 
For purposes of both sanitation and safety, the mat was designed and intended to be of 
sufficient length to allow enough steps on the mat for patrons' shoes to be cleaned of dirt 
and water before entering the hospital. The vendor demonstrated the stability of the mat 
by placing blowers at its edge and running wheelchairs over it to show that it would not 
blow or slide. This standard mat is in common use at hospitals and commercial buildings 
around the area. The doormat at issue was sold to the hospital in 1990, with a projected 
useful life of eight to ten years. During the five years it was in use prior to plaintiffs 
fall, the hospital conducted regular monthly inspections of the mat and surrounding 
premises to look for damaged carpet or tile or any dangerous condition that could cause 
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an accident. No such danger with the mat was ever observed or reported. (Warren Dep., 
R. 160-64; First Anderson Aff t, R. 28-29; Oral Findings, R. 251-52; App. 9-10.) 
During the five years the subject mat was in use prior to plaintiffs fall, the 
hospital never received any information, report, or notice that the mat had ever lifted in 
the wind, or that any person had ever fallen or tripped or had any other accident on the 
mat. (First Anderson Aff t, R. 29; Second Anderson Aff t, R. 222-23; Stout Dep., R. 
150; Anderson Dep., R. 155-56; Warren Dep., R. 164.) "Plaintiff concedes Defendant 
had no actual notice" of any danger. (Pet. 8.)2 
Plaintiff sued the hospital, alleging negligence in selection and use of the doormat. 
(R. 1-2.) The hospital moved for summary judgment on the basis that the alleged unsafe 
condition of the mat created by the sudden gust of wind was a temporary condition of 
which the hospital had no prior notice. (R. 91-100.) Plaintiff filed a cross-motion for 
summary judgment, identifying no material issue of fact. (R. 130-46.) The district court 
granted the hospital's motion on the grounds asserted and denied plaintiffs motion. 
(Order, R. 294-95, App. 5; Oral Findings, R. 253, App. 8.) The court of appeals 
affirmed: 
Plaintiff asserts that hospital personnel recognized the mat had become too limber to be safe. (Pet. 
1.) However, the assertion is untrue, and plaintiff cites no support for it. No one from the hospital 
testified that the mat was unsafe, or that they knew the mat was unsafe, prior to plaintiffs fall. 
Moreover, evidence of subsequent remedial measures is not admissible to prove negligence. Rule 407, 
Utah R. Evid. 
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Because we agree with the trial court's determination that a wind 
blown mat is a temporary condition we also concur in its determination that 
appellant has failed to establish the Hospital's liability under that theory. It 
is undisputed that the Hospital did not have actual notice that the mat had 
or would flip in the wind. Furthermore, appellant has offered no evidence 
to show that the Hospital had constructive notice of this condition. [Mem. 
Dec, App. 3.] 
The court of appeals denied plaintiffs petition for rehearing (App. 4), and plaintiff now 
seeks review in this Court. 
ARGUMENT 
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION IS CONSISTENT WITH 
CLEARLY ESTABLISHED UTAH CASE LAW; ACCORDINGLY, 
THERE IS NO "SPECIAL AND IMPORTANT" REASON FOR 
THIS COURT TO GRANT REVIEW. 
A. Legal Principles and Analytical Framework. 
Utah law governing premises liability for a slip or trip and fall is well established. 
As reaffirmed in this Court's most recent case of Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets, 918 
P.2d 476, 478 (Utah 1996), affirming summary judgment for the store owner, a property 
owner "is not a guarantor that his business invitees will not slip and fall," but is charged 
only with a duty of reasonable care. Stated otherwise, "property owners are not insurers 
of the safety of those who come upon their property, even though they are business 
invitees." Id. See also Silcox v. Skaggs Alpha Beta, Inc., 814 P.2d 623, 624 (Utah App. 
1991); Martin v. Safeway Stores Inc., 565 P.2d 1139, 1140 (Utah 1977) (affirming 
directed verdict for store owner). 
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This Court has identified two classes of negligence cases in the slip-and-fall 
context. In the first class, the property owner "must have either actual or constructive 
knowledge of the hazardous condition."' Schnuphase, supra, at 478. This class 
"involves some unsafe condition of a temporary nature, such as a slippery substance on 
the floor." Id. In such cases, the owner cannot be held liable for a resulting injury 
unless: (A) the owner had "either actual knowledge" of the condition, "or constructive 
knowledge because the condition had existed long enough that he should have 
discovered it;" and (B) "after such knowledge, sufficient time elapsed that in the exercise 
of reasonable care he should have remedied it." Id. In the second class of cases, the 
property owner must be shown to have "created the hazardous condition." Id. The 
second class "involves some unsafe condition ofa permanent nature," such as the 
structure of a building or stairway, or in equipment or machinery, or in the manner of use 
for which the owner is responsible. In such cases, "where the defendant either created 
the condition, or is responsible for it, he is deemed to know of the condition; and no 
further proof of notice is necessary." Id. However, the plaintiff must "provide evidence 
of the foreseeability of an inherently dangerous condition." Id. at 479. See also Allen v. 
Federated Dairy Farms, 538 P.2d 175, 176 (Utah 1975). 
The case of Martin v. Safeway Stores Inc., supra, which is the closest case 
factually to the present case, illustrates application of the class-one analysis. There, the 
plaintiff slipped and fell on a weather-caused patch of ice on a sidewalk leading to the 
store entrance. The ice had formed after the removal of fallen snow. Recognizing the 
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temporary nature of the icy spot, this Court affirmed a directed verdict for the store 
because its employees had no notice of the danger and could not reasonably be expected 
to prevent all weather-related risks on the outdoor sidewalk entry. 565 P.2d at 1140-41. 
The Court reasoned that owners of buildings with public access "are not insurers against 
all forms of accidents" and, therefore, have no duty "to mop the sidewalk dry or take 
other steps necessary to prevent the accumulation of moisture on the sidewalk that might 
freeze and create an icy condition." A/, at 1141. 
Other cases demonstrate the clear dichotomy between the two categories of cases. 
Class-one cases focus on the temporary nature of the dangerous condition and are 
distinguishable from structural or inherent dangers. See, e.g., Schnuphase v. Storehouse 
Markets, supra (ice cream dropped by a customer; summary judgment for the store); 
Allen v. Federated Dairy Farms, supra (cottage cheese sample dropped by a customer; 
summary judgment for the store); Long v. Smith Food King Store, 531 P.2d 360 (Utah 
1973) (pumpkin pie sample dropped on floor; summary judgment for the store); Koer v. 
Mayfair Markets, 431 P.2d 566 (Utah 1967) (grape dropped on floor; judgment NOV for 
the store); Hampton v. Rowley Builder's Supply, 350 P.2d 151 (Utah 1960) (slip on small 
rock on store steps; verdict for the store). By contrast, cases involving a danger that is 
permanent or structural or that is inherent in the owner's chosen method of operation fall 
into class two. See, e.g., De Weese v. J.C. Penney Co., 297 P.2d 898 (Utah 1956) 
(inclined terrazo entry way that becomes slippery in the rain); Canfieldv. Albertsons, Inc., 
841 P.2d 1224 (Utah App. 1992) (self-help lettuce display in which customers are 
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expected to remove and drop outer leaves to the floor). Accordingly, the lower courts in 
this case correctly applied the class-one analysis. 
B. The Present Case Fits the Class-one Category. 
As the two lower courts held, this case falls into the first class of slip-and-fall 
cases because the unsafe condition that caused plaintiffs fall was the sudden and 
temporary lifting of the edge of the doormat by a gust of wind. (Mem. Dec. at 2, App. 2; 
Dist. Ct. Oral Findings, App. 9-10.) The hospital did not create a dangerous condition 
merely by placing the mat outside its entry. In fact, placement of outside mats is 
expected, and possibly even required, as a risk management precaution to prevent dirt 
and water from being tracked inside the hospital. The mat itself was not dangerous in its 
typical flat position; it was used as designed and intended. Rather, the mat became 
temporarily dangerous only when a gust of wind suddenly lifted its edge just as plaintiff 
stepped onto it. The mat resumed its innocuous flat position when the wind subsided. 
There is no evidence that the mat had ever been lifted or flipped by the wind at any time 
prior to plaintiffs fall. Moreover, because the wind flipped up the mat just as plaintiff 
stepped onto it, the hospital obviously had no time to remove the danger prior to her fall. 
(Mem. Dec. at 2, App. 2.) As with the entry sidewalk in Martin, supra, the mat was not 
permanently or structurally unsafe; rather, it was rendered temporarily unsafe by the 
weather. Like the store in Martin, the hospital cannot reasonably be expected to 
eliminate all risk of weather-related hazards on its outside walkways, particularly a 
temporaiy hazard of which it had no prior notice. As the court of appeals concluded, this 
8 
is a class-one case because "[a] wind blown mat is more akin to a slippery substance on 
the floor" than to any permanent or structural condition. {Id.) 
Under the class-one analysis, the hospital is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. Plaintiff concedes that the hospital had no actual notice of the danger. (Pet. 3,8.) 
Moreover, the hospital could not possibly have had constructive notice of the danger 
because the danger existed only momentarily, with no time to discover and remedy it 
prior to plaintiffs fall. See Schnuphase, supra, 918 P.2d at 478. (Mem. Dec. at 3; App. 
3.) Therefore, the court of appeals decision, affirming summary judgment for the 
hospital, is consistent with prior case law.3 
C. Plaintiffs Claim of Conflicting Case Law Has No Merit. 
Plaintiff argues that this Court should grant review because the court of appeals 
decision conflicts with prior decisions of this Court and the court of appeals. (Pet. 13.) 
However, plaintiff has failed to cite any conflicting case. 
Plaintiff relies heavily on Canfieldv. Albertsons, Inc., supra, decided by the court 
of appeals, arguing that it compels application of the class-two analysis in this case. (Pet. 
5-7.) However, Canfield is easily distinguished and should be limited to its unique facts, 
3
 Under the facts of this case, the summary judgment could also be affirmed on the basis of 
superseding natural cause. For example, in Morril v. Morril, 142 A. 337 (N.J. 1928), the plaintiff was 
injured on the defendant's property when a door with a broken latch suddenly blew open and hit him in 
the eye. The court ruled for the defendant as a matter of law because the defendant had no duty to 
anticipate that the wind would olow the door open; accordingly, the proximate cause of the injury was 
not the broken latch or the failure to fix it, but the wind. The "innocuous act of ownership" cannot be 
held "to comprehend the unanticipated and unexpected blast of wind which it is conceded blew the door 
open." Id. at 340. "Where the alleged negligent act is separate from the injury done by the intervention 
of. . . the forces of nature, there can be no recovery." Id. at 341. 
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as this Court acknowledged in Schnuphase, supra. In Canfield, the plaintiff slipped on a 
lettuce leaf from a "farmer's pack display" in which lettuce was left in its original boxes, 
leaving the removal of damaged or wilted leaves to the customers, and resulting in 
discarded leaves on the floor around the display. 841 P.2d at 1225. The court held that 
class-two analysis applied because the store chose a method of operation by which it was 
expected that customers would remove and discard the outer lettuce leaves, thereby 
creating a reasonably foreseeable dangerous condition. Id. at 1226-27. Because the 
danger was reasonably foreseeable, the owner's notice of that danger was "not relevant"; 
rather, the issue was whether the owner "took reasonable precautions to protect 
customers against the dangerous condition it created." Id. at 1227. 
By contrast, plaintiff presented no evidence in the present case that the hospital 
created a dangerous condition merely by placing a standard doormat outside its entry. 
Placement of outside doormats is a standard safety precaution. The mat enhances safety; 
it does not create inherent danger. The mat was rendered temporarily dangerous only by 
the sudden gust of wind that lifted its edge under plaintiffs step. The hospital no more 
created a danger by placing the doormat outside its door than did the store in Martin by 
pouring a concrete sidewalk that could become slippery in a snowstorm. It is not the mat 
or the sidewalk that is inherently dangerous, but the temporary forces of nature working 
on them. 
As noted, this Court similarly distinguished Canfield in Schnuphase, rejecting 
application of class-two analysis to a slip on ice cream because merely allowing 
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customers to eat ice cream in the store does not create a foreseeable dangerous condition. 
"In a series of cases, this court has stated that foreseeability and inherent danger are key 
elements of a negligence action under the second theory of liability.... While we do not 
limit the second class of cases to only those operations which are permanently employed, 
inherent danger and foreseeability remain essential elements of the claim." 918 P.2d at 
479. Because the plaintiff failed to present evidence of a foreseeable inherent danger, the 
store was exonerated as a matter of law. Id. "Not every accident that occurs gives rise to 
a cause of action upon which the party injured may recover damages from someone. 
Thousands of accidents occur every day for which no one is liable in damages, and often 
no one is to blame, not even the ones who are injured." Id. at 479-80, quoting Martin, 
supra, at 1142. Similarly, in the present case, plaintiff presented no evidence that 
placement of a doormat created a foreseeable inherent danger. Therefore, class-two 
analysis does not apply.4 
Plaintiff also relies on De Weese v. J.C. Penney Co., supra, for the proposition 
that weather-related hazards should not be considered temporary, but should be 
addressed under the class-two analysis. (Pet. 9, 15.) However, the basis for owner 
4
 Plaintiff asserts that the doormat "had been unsafe for some time before Plaintiff fell," and that the 
hospital should have discovered or foreseen the danger. (Pet. 9, 16.) However, this is pure conjecture, 
not supported by any evidence. The only evidence shows that the hospital did conduct regular 
inspections and had no prior notice or indication of any such danger. The mere fact that the mat was 
more limber in the fifth year of its ten-year life than in the first does not prove that the mat had become 
inherently unsafe. Again, the danger here, if any, was not the mat in its natural state, but the mat as 
temporarily flipped up by the wind. As the district court expressly concluded, plaintiff presented no 
evidence to show constructive knowledge of any danger. (App. 11.) Plaintiffs position that a property 
owner has a duty to discover ill possible risks of danger, on penalty of liability if undiscovered, amounts 
to strict liability, which this Court has rejected. See Schnuphase, supra, at 478 
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liability in De Weese was not that the weather condition was permanent, but that the 
inclined terrazzo surface in the store's entry "is part of the permanent structure of the 
building." 297 P.2d at 901. Because the evidence showed that the owner "knew of the 
characteristic of terrazzo to become slippery when wet," a jury question was presented on 
whether the owner took reasonable precautions to prevent the foreseeable danger. Id. 
By contrast, as noted above, no evidence was presented in the present case to show any 
prior knowledge or indication of danger in use of the doormat. Moreover, this Court has 
never held that weather-related hazards always require class-two analysis. See Martin v. 
Safeway Stores, supra (requiring notice of temporary icy spot on the sidewalk entrance to 
the store). 
In summary, plaintiff has demonstrated no conflict between the court of appeals 
decision and any prior case. Rather, the analysis and result are absolulely consistent with 
the long line of appellate decisions in this state. The law is clear and well-established, 
and it was correctly applied in this case. Plaintiff has demonstrated no reason at all why 
this case should go through another layer of appeal, and certainly not any of the "special 
and important reasons" identified in Rule 46, Utah R. App. P. Therefore, the petition for 
writ of certiorari should be denied.5 
Plaintiffs arguments in Points 3 and 4 do not merit a response. As is apparent from all the cases 
discussed herein, as well as established principles of negligence, plaintiff was not entitled to summary 
judgment simply by proving that she was injured as a result of an unsafe condition, and her cited cases 
stand for no such proposition. Moreover, plaintiff has cited no basis for the hospital to pay her legal fees. 
(Mem. Dec. at 3, App. 3.) Rather, it is the hospital that should be compensated for having to defend this 
meritless case in three different courts. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, this Court should deny the petition for writ of certiorari. 
Respectfully submitted this zv .day of January, 1999. 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
Bv: ^ Z ^ C c ^ ^ p ^ J ^ ^ A 
Charles W. Dahlquist, II 
Merrill F. Nelson 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
Catherine L. Durborow, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
FILED 
OCT 0 1 lags 
COURT OF APPEALS 
IHC Hospital, Inc.; and 
Cottonwood Hospital 
Medical Center, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Case No. 971309-CA 
F I L E D 
(October 1, 1998) 
Third District, Salt Lake Department 
The Honorable Glenn A. Iwasaki 
Attorneys: Samuel King and David J. Friel, Salt Lake City, for 
Appellant 
Charles Dahlquist, Merrill F. Nelson, and David J. 
Hardy, Salt Lake City, for Appellees 
Before Judges Davis, Wilkins, and Greenwood. 
WILKINS, Associate Presiding Judge: 
Appellant Catherine L. Durborow brought suit against 
defendant IHC Hospital (Hospital) for personal injuries sustained 
as a result of a slip and fall in the entrance of its Cottonwood 
Hospital Medical Center. Durborow appeals the trial court's 
grant of summary judgment to IHC. We affirm. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Summary judgment is proper if there are no genuine issues of 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). In determining whether 
the trial court properly granted summary judgment, we review the 
facts in the light most favorable to the losing party and give no 
deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. See Lister v. 
Utah Valley Community College 881 P.2d 933, 937 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994). Typically, claims involving negligence are not 
susceptible to summary judgment; however, where the "facts are 
undisputed and only one conclusion can be^drawn from them," 
summary disposition is appropriate. Silcox v. Skaaas Alpha Beta, 
Inc., 814 P.2d 623, 624 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
0000002 
ANALYSIS 
Appellant does not dispute the trial court!s factual 
findings. Rather, appellant contests the legal conclusion that a 
wind blown mat is a temporary condition for purposes of analysis 
under our case law. Appellant argues that because the Hospital 
created the condition that injured her this case must be analyzed 
under the principles relating to an unsafe condition of a 
permanent nature. Also, appellant contests the trial court's 
determination that she is not entitled to fees and costs against 
the Hospital under Rule 11. 
1. Negligence 
Under Utah law there are two negligence theories by which a 
business owner can be held liable for injuries incurred by 
patrons. The first theory requires that the business owner have 
actual or constructive knowledge of a temporarily unsafe 
condition and sufficient time has passed after discovery of the 
condition so that the owner, in the exercise of reasonable care, 
should have remedied the condition. See Schmuphase v. Storehouse 
Markets, 918 P.2d 476, 478 (Utah 1996). The second theory 
involves an unsafe condition of a permanent nature which the 
business owner created or controls. See id. Under this theory 
the owner is deemed to be aware of the condition and therefore, 
notice is immaterial. See id. 
Appellant contends that the trial court erred by finding 
that a wind blown mat is a temporary condition and therefore, 
misapplied the law. However, the uncontested facts are that the 
mat had been in the same place for five years without incident. 
Furthermore, there was no evidence presented that the mat had 
ever flipped in the wind before that day. The trial court 
determined that the mat only became unsafe momentarily when it 
was blown by wind strong enough to move it. 
Although the wind is a permanent feature of the environment, 
it does not follow that the matfs unforseen yet potential 
susceptibility to the wind makes it a permanently unsafe 
condition. In other words, the dangerous condition arose only 
momentarily when the mat was lifted by the wind. In Allen v. 
Federated Dairy Farms, Inc., 538 P.2d 175 (Utah 1975) the Utah 
Supreme Court provided examples of what constitutes a permanent 
as opposed to a temporary unsafe condition. The court stated 
that a slippery substance on the floor is a condition of a 
temporary nature, whereas, the structure of a building or a 
stairway is a permanent condition. See id. at 176. A wind blown 
mat is more akin to a slippery substance on the floor because 
both the mat and the floor become dangerous only when coupled 
with another element. See Long v. Smith Food King Store, 531 
P«.2d 360, 362 (Utah 1973). Because thera-were no facts 
presented, nor any basis from which a fair inference could be 
drawn that the wind blown mat is a permanent condition, we cannot 
UUUUUUcJ 
agree with Durborow's contention that the trial court improperly 
applied the law. 
Because we agree with the trial courtfs determination that a 
wind b.lown mat is a temporary condition we also concur in its 
determination that appellant has failed to establish the 
Hospital's liability under that theory. It is undisputed that 
the Hospital did not have actual notice that the mat had or would 
flip in the wind. Furthermore, appellant has offered no evidence 
to show that the Hospital had constructive notice of this 
condition. 
2. Rule 11 
Appellant asserts that she is entitled to attorney fees and 
costs under Rule 11 because the Hospital's arguments are not 
warranted by the existing law. See Utah R. Civ. P. 11. When 
reviewing a trial court's Rule 11 determination, we review the 
trial court's conclusion under a correction of error standard. 
See Barnard v. Sutliff, 846 P.2d 1229, 1235 (Utah 1992) . In 
determining whether conduct violates Rule 11, the court must 
focus on whether the alleged violater's research into the law and 
facts surrounding a filing is "objectively reasonable under all 
circumstances." Id. at 1236. After reviewing the record, we 
have determined that the trial court's conclusion that the 
Hospital did not violate Rule 11 is correct. The Hospital's 
claim that appellant's accident was the result of an "Act of God" 
was not objectively unreasonable nor meritless under the 
circumstances. Furthermore, the Hospital's argument that this 
case should be analyzed as a temporary condition is warranted by 
the law. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's conclusion that 
the Hospital did not violate Rule 11. 
Affirmed. 
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Catherine L. Durborow, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
IHC Hospital, Inc.; and 
Cottonwood Hospital Medical 
Center, 
Defendants and Appellees 
ORDER 
Case No. 971309-CA 
This matter is before the court upon appellant's petition 
for rehearing, filed October L5, 1998. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for rehearing is 
denied. 
Dated this CP ?day of October, 1998. 
FOR THE COURT: 
Michael J. Wilkins, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
Charles W. Dahlquist, II (A0798) 
David J. Hardy (A5963) 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
Attorneys for Defendant 
COTTONWOOD HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 328-3600 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CATHERINE L. DURBOROW, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
IHC HOSPITALS, INC , COTTONWOOD 
HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 950905016PI 
Judge Glenn K Iwasaki 
This matter has came before the court on the Motion for Summary Judgment of 
defendant Cottonwood Hospital Medical Center. Defendant submitted memoranda in support 
of the Motion and Plaintiff submitted memoranda opposing the Motion. In connection with her 
opposition, plaintiff also filed a Counter Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. A hearing on 
the Motion for Summary Judgment was held September 23, 1996, with Samuel King and 
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David J. Friel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff and David J. Hardy appearing on behalf of 
defendant. At that hearing, plaintiff withdrew her Counter Motion. 
Following the court's ruling in favor of defendant on the Motion for Summary 
Judgment, plaintiff filed a Motion to Set Aside Summary Judgment and to Grant Her Motions. 
Plaintiff and defendant filed memoranda in support of and opposing the Motion. A hearing on 
this Motion was held on January 10, 1997, with Samuel King and David J. Friel appearing on 
behalf of plaintiff and David J. Hardy on behalf of defendant. 
For purposes of this motion, the court has resolved doubts concerning questions of fact 
in favor of plaintiff and has therefore assumed that plaintiff was injured when a mat on 
defendant's property flipped in the wind and caused her to fall. The court further assumes that 
the mat flipping in the wind was an unsafe condition. 
Based on the recoid presented, the court finds as follows: 
1. The instrument causing plaintiff to fall, a mat flipping in the wind, was a 
condition of a temporary nature arising from the weather, 
2. There is no dispute of fact as to whether defendant had notice that the mat had 
or would flip in the wind, as all of the evidence presented to the court shows that defendant 
had no notice that the mat had ever previously flipped in the wind; 
3. The evidence as to the age of the mat, testing performed at the time the mat was 
purchased, and the regular inspections of the premises conducted by defendant, shows, without 
dispute, that defendant did not have constructive knowledgeofc&t the mat had or would flip in 
the wind and create an unsafe condition. 
2 
WHEREFORE, based on the findings set forth herein and other good cause shown, the 
Motion for Summary Judgment is granted, Plaintiffs Motion to Set Aside Summary Judgment 
and Grant Her Motions is denied, and Plaintiff's request for an award of attorney fees is 
denied. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs claims against IHC Health Services, Inc. 
(formerly IHC Hospitals, Inc.) and Cottonwood Hospital Medical Center are dismissed with 
prejudice. 
,.3/ DATED this '' day of January, 1997. 
BY THE COURT: 
•„ v*5©^ Glenn K. Iwasaki, District Judge 
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1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 THE COURT: This is a case in which it comes 
3 down to whether or not I determine with confidence as to 
4 whether .this was a temporary on a. permanent condition-
5 And I think the analysis is something more than just the 
6 use of — just the employment of a rug outside of the 
7 entrance* 
8 The dangerous condition in this matter was not 
9 the rug per se, but it was a rug that would be 
10 susceptible to high gusts — to gusts of wind, however 
11 that is determined, and there's a conflict there — to 
12 gusts of wind that happened, lift it and flap it in the 
13 wind, thus causing someone to fall upon it. 
14 The Court is of the opinion that this fall is 
15 within the temporary category rather than the permanent 
16 category. And I reference that as to the descriptions 
17 given in the Schnuphase case, vs. Allen, that this is a 
18 temporary condition in that the — the use of the 
19 carpeting was for the safety of ingress and egress, to 
20 keep a dry area that people can go in and out of the 
21 hospital* The condition was of a. temporary one in that 
22 the wind situation did not permanently create it, but 
23 created it only as to the gusts that were strong enough 
24 to move it* 
25 The Court is aware of Mr. King's argument in 
that they chose to put xt that way;, howeverr at the time 
the decision was made to use the carpetingv there was 
affidavits iix this case that indicated that a — certain 
tests were, used to show that the carpet would not be 
moved"in ~a~~s trongpwind ^ ~r:Andr—±n-fact ^  there_was 
affidavits that -indicated .that a. blower was. used..and it 
did not change it-
The affidavit subsequent to the injury — I 
don't contest the contents — indicated that it was not 
of the same condition as it was when it was purchased; 
however, there- was a warranty to some extent, of which 
you could — reasonably could rely upon it in that the 
carpeting was good for ten years*. But it wasn't, in. my 
recollection, of the facts,, any qualifications as to ten 
years- being indoor or outdoor*,. It was- ten yeairs*- And Z 
stand corrected if that's; the case., 
But regardless" of which, it was an. 
indoor/outdoor carpeting,, which has been —....which, has 
been, conceded more or less- And. the use of that 
carperxng aia not exceed even, two — wellr about 
two-thirds- of: the life of — even on. an eight-year, aspect 
of ;xt,t -or at least 75vpercent of itr on: an. eight-year 
aspect of It;; therefore,- it,Js^ presumed^ .then,-.^ for 
reasonable people to assume that still —* .that, it was 
still wear-worthy at. that time-
OOOOOl1 
1 I also have to balance who bears the risk of 
2 this matter- And that's the hardest question I have to 
3 face- If there was any indication that Cottonwood 
4 Hospital had any inkling or notification whatsoever as- to 
5 the condition of this carpeting- in a. windr there's no 
6" question in my mind that a. motion for summary judgment 
7 would be denied, and denied emphatically-
8 However, it appears uncontested that prior to 
9 the unfortunate incident in this case here, there was 
10 absolutely no notice at all and no indication that 
11 defendants were put on any notice that that condition was 
12 dangerous as to the condition which caused the fall in 
13 this matterr i-e-r dangerous as to its flapping in a wind 
14 gustr thus causing- the plaintiffr or any other person, to 
15 fall as ^ a. result of that flapping-
16 Therefore
 r the finding of the Court is that 
17 this was a. temporary condition; that being a temporary 
18 conditionr that prior notice must be given, and shown-
19 The plaintiff has the burden of doing- that- That is 
20 absent in the record^ as far as I'm. concerned;: therefore,. 
21 motion for" summary judgment is- granted, on behalf of .: 
22 defendant IHC Eospitar^ 
23 "Both: sides of that * (Inaudible) or sanctions in 
24 this matter- Both sides- a request for fees and/or 
25 sanctions are denied- Ifind that there was a 
513 UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE Rule 46 
Appeals or which are cases of first impression under state or federal law which 
will have wide applicability. 
(Amended effective November 1, 1996.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amend- Compiler's Notes. — The Advisory Com-
ment deleted circuit courts from the list of mittee Note to Rule 42 also applies to this rule, 
courts in Subdivision (c)(2). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229 Social Servs. v. Sucec, 924 P.2d 882 (Utah 
(Utah 1996); State v. Gordon, 913 R2d 350 1996). 
(Utah 1996); State ex rel. Utah State Dep't of 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments 
in Utah Law — The Utah Court of Appeals, 
1988 Utah L. Rev. 150. 
Rule 44. Transfer of improperly pursued appeals. 
If a notice of appeal or a petition for review is filed in a timely manner but 
is pursued in an appellate court that does not have jurisdiction in the case, the 
appellate court, either on its own motion [or] on motion of any party, shall 
transfer the case, including the record on appeal, all motions and other orders, 
and a copy of the docket entries, to the court with appellate jurisdiction in the 
case. The clerk of the transferring court shall give notice to all parties and to 
the clerk of the trial court of the order transferring the case. The time for filing 
all papers in a transferred case shall be calculated according to the time 
schedule of the receiving court. 
Advisory Committee Note* — Rule 4C is and Court of Appeals have jurisdiction over the 
renumbered as Rule 44. It is amended to permit review of formal adjudicative proceedings. Pro-
the transfer of an appeal that 13 timely but vided that all parties ha.ve notice of the intent 
improperly filed not only between the Supreme to seek judicial review, the same policy consid-
Court and Court of Appeals but also to the erations that permit the transfer of an improp-
District Court. Under the Administrative Pro- erly filed appeal between the Supreme Court 
cedures Act, the District Court has jurisdiction and the Court of Appeals should permit the 
to review informal adjudicative proceedings of transfer of such a case to the District Court, 
administrative agencies. The Supreme Court 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Alumbaugh v. White, 800 P.2d 825 199 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Padilla v. Utah Bd. of 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990); State v. Garcia, 805 P.2d Pardons, 820 P.2d 473 (Utah 1991). 
TITLE VII. JURISDICTION ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO COURT OF APPEALS 
Rule 45, Review of judgments, orders, and decrees of court of appeals. 
Unless otherwise provided by law, the review of a judgment, an order, and a 
decree (herein referred to as "decisions") of the Court of Appeals shall be 
initiated by a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Utah. 
Rule 46. Considerations governing review of certiorari. 
(a) Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial 
discretion, and will be granted only for special and important reasons. The 
following, while neither controlling nor wholly measuring the Supreme Court's 
discretion, indicate the character of reasons that will be considered: 
Rule 47 UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 514 
(1) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision in conflict 
with a decision of another panel of the Court of Appeals on the same issue of 
*
a w ;
 *—~ 
(2) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided a question of state or 
federal law in a way that is in conflict with a decision of the Supreme Court; 
(3) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision that has 
so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings or 
has so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower court as to call for an exercise 
of the Supreme Court's power of supervision; or 
(4) When the. Court of Appeals has decided an" important question of 
municipal, state, or federal law which has not been, but should be, settled by 
the Supreme Court. 
(b) After a petition for certiorari has been filed, the panel that issued the 
opinion of the Court of Appeals may issue a minute entry recommending that 
the Supreme Court grant the petition. Parties shall not request such a 
recommendation by motion or otherwise. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992; July 1, 1994.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend- redesignating former Subdivisions (a) to (d) as 
ment added the Subdivision (a) designation, (a)(1) to (4), and added Subdivision (b). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97 
(Utah 1992). 
Rule 47. Certification and transmission of record; joint and separate 
petitions; cross-petitions; part ies . 
(a) Joint and separate petitions; cross-petitions. Parties interested jointly, 
severally, or otherwise in a decision may join in a petition for a writ of 
certiorari; any one or more of them may petition separately; or any two or more 
of them may join in a petition. When two or more cases are sought to be 
reviewed on certiorari and involve identical or closely related questions, it will 
suffice to file a single petition for a writ of certiorari covering all the cases. A 
cross-petition for writ of certiorari shall not be joined with any other filing. 
(b) Parties. All parties to the proceeding in the Court of Appeals shall be 
deemed parties in the Supreme Court, unless the petitioner notifies the Clerk 
of the Supreme Court in writing of the petitioner's belief that one or more of the 
parties below have no interest in the outcome of the petition. A copy of such 
notice shall be served on all parties to the proceeding below, and a party noted 
as no longer interested may remain a party by notifying the clerk, with service 
on the other parties, that the party has an interest in the petition. 
(c) Motion for certification and transmission of record. A party intending to 
file a petition for certiorari, prior to filing the petition or at any time prior to 
action by the Supreme Court on the petition, may file a motion for an order to 
have the Clerk of the Court of Appeals or the clerk of the trial court certify the 
record, or any part of it, and provide for its transmission to the Supreme Court. 
Motions to certify the record prior to action on the petition by the Supreme 
Court should rarely be made, only when the record is essential to the Supreme 
Court's proper understanding of the petition or the brief in opposition and such 
understanding cannot be derived from the contents of tke^petition or the brief 
in opposition, including the appendix. If a motion is appropriate, it shall be 
made to the Supreme Court after the filing of a petition but prior to action by 
the Supreme Court on the petition. In the case of a stay of execution of a 
